With April 30, 2025, being the 50th anniversary of North Vietnam’s defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War, it is worth revisiting the role that the U.S. national-security establishment’s assassination of President Kennedy played in that war.
The story begins with the war between JFK and the U.S. national-security establishment that broke out after the Bay of Pigs disaster soon after Kennedy assumed the presidency. The CIA was hoping to manipulate Kennedy into providing air support for the operation, but the scheme failed. Realizing what the CIA had done, Kennedy vowed to “splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds.” For it’s part, the CIA was livid over what it believed was Kennedy’s cowardice, weakness, and incompetence for failing to come to the assistance of the Cuban exiles, all of whom were killed or captured by Cuba’s communist forces while invading the island.
Afterwards, the Pentagon began pressuring Kennedy into ordering a full-scale military invasion of Cuba. That’s what the Pentagon’s infamous false-flag Operation Northwoods was all about, which Kennedy, to his everlasting credit, rejected.
Then came the Cuban Missile Crisis, which Kennedy settled by committing that the U.S. would not invade Cuba — in return for the Russians removing their nuclear missiles from the island. That meant that Cuba would remain permanently under communist control, which the Pentagon and the CIA were convinced was a grave threat to “national security.” Kennedy was, once again, considered a weak, incompetent, and cowardly president who had now placed the United States in grave jeopardy of being taken over by the Reds. A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff compared Kennedy’s agreement with the Russians to Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler at Munich. Another said that the deal was “the greatest defeat in our history.”
It was the Cuban Missile Crisis that caused JFK to achieve a “breakthrough,” one that enabled him to see that the national-security establishment’s “Cold War” against Russia was one great big deadly, dangerous, and destructive racket. It was at that point that Kennedy decided to bring the racket to an end.
In June 1963, Kennedy delivered his famous Peace Speech at American University. It was essentially a declaration of war against the national-security establishment. In the speech, Kennedy made it clear that America was now moving in a totally different direction — one that was based on peace and mutual cooperation with the communist world, including Russia.
Kennedy then secured the approval of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, over the vehement objections of the Pentagon and the CIA.
And then he ordered a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam, which, in the eyes of the national-security establishment, meant that the dominoes would start falling to the communists, with the final domino being the United States.
Given that the next presidential election wasn’t until late 1964 and given that JFK stood a good chance of winning reelection, the national-security establishment knew that it had to act now in order to save America. Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963, on the streets of Dallas elevated Vice-President Lyndon Johnson to the presidency. Since Johnson was on the same page as the national-security establishment, he immediately reversed the direction that Kennedy was taking America and restored the old Cold War racket of the U.S. national-security establishment.
While the national-security establishment wanted Johnson to invade Cuba, he refused to do so. While a full-scale invasion would easily have been successful in achieving regime change in Cuba, Johnson knew that the Russians could retaliate by taking West Berlin, which necessarily would have required a U.S. response. Thus, Johnson wisely refused to succumb to the Pentagon/CIA pressure to invade Cuba.
However, reversing JFK’s order to withdraw U.S. troops from Vietnam, Johnson decided to throw an anti-communist bone to the national-security establishment by giving it the war it wanted against the Reds in Vietnam. Soon after Johnson won election in 1964, he and the national-security establishment concocted the fake North Vietnamese attack on U.S. forces in the Gulf of Tonkin. That enabled them to secure the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution from Congress, which ultimately led to the needless sacrifice of more than 58,000 American soldiers, not to mention the killing of more than a million Vietnamese.
Since Johnson died in 1973, unfortunately he didn’t get to witness U.S. officials on April 30, 1975, on the roof of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon scrambling to get on U.S. military helicopters in the hope of avoiding capture by the victorious North Vietnamese forces.
See FFF’s book JFK’s War with the National Security Establishment: Why Kennedy Was Assassinated by Douglas Horne, who served on the staff of the Assassination Records Review Board in the 1990s.
Written by Jacob G. Hornberger for The Future of Freedom Foundation ~ May 1, 2025
Kennedy inherited a situation where the United States was increasingly involved in Vietnam, primarily through military advisors and aid to the South Vietnamese government. Seeking to counter the communist insurgency, Kennedy authorized a gradual increase in American military presence, including the deployment of more advisors and the augmentation of military aid. Moreover, he implemented initiatives like the strategic hamlet program to consolidate rural populations into fortified villages to undermine Viet Cong influence. These initiatives reflected Kennedy’s commitment to bolstering South Vietnam’s capacity to resist communist forces.
Kennedy’s support for the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnam was central to his approach to the conflict. While recognizing Diem’s authoritarian tendencies and governance challenges, Kennedy viewed him as a crucial ally in the fight against communism. However, as Diem’s regime faced mounting criticism and internal dissent, Kennedy grappled with the complexities of supporting a regime that struggled to maintain stability and legitimacy.
Despite escalating military involvement, Kennedy remained aware of the limitations of a purely military solution in Vietnam. As the conflict persisted and challenges mounted, Kennedy and his advisors continually assessed the effectiveness of their strategies. This evaluation process led to reevaluating approaches, with Kennedy increasingly exploring diplomatic avenues and considering the possibility of negotiations with North Vietnam. Kennedy’s willingness to adapt and reconsider strategies reflected his pragmatism and recognition of the need for a multifaceted approach to address the complexities of the conflict.
Kennedy’s presidency laid the groundwork for the deepening involvement of the United States in Vietnam, setting the stage for the significant escalation under his successors. While his tenure saw a commitment to bolstering South Vietnam’s defenses and confronting communist forces, it also underscored the challenges and complexities of intervention in a distant conflict. Kennedy’s approach to Vietnam continues to be a subject of historical debate, with assessments of his decisions and legacy shaped by diverse perspectives and interpretations.